Welcome
to this discussion on orientations in African philosophy. We shall examine the
contents of this topic under four main sub-headings which are:
1.
Ethno-philosophy
2.
Philosophic Sagacity
3.
Nationalist-Ideological Philosophy
4.
Professional Philosophy.
The
definition, methodology and content of African philosophy are, to a
considerable extent, according to how it is understood by different scholars.
Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera Oruka has
distinguished what he calls four trends in modern African philosophy: ethno philosophy, philosophical sagacity,
nationalistic–ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy.
These
scholars are, in turn, constituted into different schools (or, more precisely,
orientations) on the basis of the similarities of their positions, in broad
strokes.
Therefore,
we shall be considering the four orientations in African philosophy according
to the most popular classification.
At
the end of this article, you should be familiar with the four major
orientations in African philosophy as classified by Odera Oruka, be able to
understand the strengths and weaknesses of each orientation, and know how an
understanding of what African philosophy is derived largely from the
perspective of the orientation one is coming from.
Orientations in African Philosophy
The
question of the existence or nature of African philosophy is also implicated in
the trends or orientations in African philosophy.
For,
to a considerable extent, these trends or schools are divided according to
their understanding of what African philosophy should be. According to Bruce B.
Janz, “The central concern of African philosophy in the twentieth century,
often to the frustration of its practitioners, is over the existence and nature
of African philosophy.”
This
is especially obvious in the dispute between ‘professional philosophers’ and
those who practice what they have designated as ‘ethno philosophy’.
As
to this dispute about what African philosophy is, Janz says: African philosophy’s
development in the twentieth century is both relatively recent, traceable to
some seminal texts, and ancient, drawing on cultural forms that stretch back in
time and space. This seeming contradiction can be understood if we realize that
philosophy itself is ambiguous.
It
designates on one hand a set of reflective practices rooted in culture and
reason, which rigorously and critically explicate a life-world, and on the
other a discipline in the university, with a set of codes, standards, recognized
practitioners, and customs.
Although
there are shades of opinion on the subject, the prevailing position is that
there are four main approaches to African philosophy.
This
position was popularized by Henry Odera Oruka (1978) and it identifies the
trends as ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalist-ideological
philosophy, and professional philosophy.
1. Ethno-philosophy
This refers to the position that the traditional practices, proverbs, belief
systems, folklores and other related things in Africa constitute the content,
or at least the basic material, for authentic African philosophy.
According
to Segun Gbadegesin, in this sense, it is the philosophy indigenous to Africans
untainted by foreign ideas. To attain a deep understanding of this philosophy,
then, one needs to go to the roots in the traditions of the people without the
mediating influence of the westernised folks.
The
term ‘Ethno-philosophy’ was coined by Paulin Hountondji (1976) to describe the
work of those who researched into the thoughts and practices of traditional
Africa and described their work as philosophy. And it is to Hountondji that
ethnophilosophy owes its pejorative connotation and the negative
characterisation it has had, especially among francophone African scholars.
For
Oruka, Hountondji and Bodunrin, ethno-philosophy is only philosophy in a
debased sense since, according to them, what ethno-philosophers try to do is to
describe a world outlook or thought system of a particular African community,
or the whole of Africa. This is a position that is opposed to seeing philosophy
as a body of logically-argued thoughts of individuals.
Ethno-philosophy
is best appreciated in the context that it constitutes a first line of defence
against the Eurocentric charge that Africans are intellectually inferior and
therefore have no philosophy.
It
is to this effect that such African scholars as Leopold Sedar Senghor, Bolaji
Idowu, Alexis Kagame, K. C. Anyanwu and John S. Mbiti wrote in defence of the
dignity of the African.
One
might consider as an exception in this regard, the writer who is commonly
identified as the pioneer of ethno-philosophy, Placide Tempels, a European
missionary working in Africa, who, as already pointed out, was writing for a
European audience and essentially advocating that his compatriots take time to
understand the thinking that underlies African values and practices.
Practitioners
of ethno-philosophy assert that African philosophy is basically the reflection
of philosophers on the African reality.
According
to K. C. Anyanwu, a vigorous defender of this position, African philosophy
should be essentially a “reflection on the African cultural experience, or the
exposition of the basic assumptions, concepts and theories which underline
African cultural experience and activities.”
A
major critique of ethno-philosophy is that it represents a communal position.
According to critics, mainly of the professional orientation, there is no
‘communal consciousness’ as such. A position, to be philosophical, has to be
individual or personal.
A
community is a collection of individuals with individual minds, thoughts and
reason. If an idea therefore leads to a communal practice, that in no way
implies a communal origin. It is in fact impossible to have an idea or practice
that does not owe its origin to an individual. But if its adoption by a
community robs it of its philosophical status, then same can be said of the
ideas of thinkers like John Locke whose sociopolitical doctrine functions today
as the foundation of Western democracy. Gbadegesin says in this regard: Of
course, there is no communal thought in the sense of a group mind because there
is no group with a single mind. But from this it does not follow that we cannot
talk intelligently of the cultural beliefs and values of a people, arising from
their common reflections on their common experience.
Other
critiques of ethno-philosophy include the charge that it is uncritical (that it
merely describes traditional African practices and thoughts); that it is
unsystematic (it does not follow standard philosophical procedures); and that
it is based on unwritten African traditions – and therefore difficult to track
and engage directly.
About
the charge that African traditional thought is uncritical (or ‘insufficiently
critical’) or anything but perfect, Kwasi Wiredu has this to says: My main
unhappiness with the traditionalist approach derives from its insufficiently
critical stance. Just as there was an element of implied evaluation in the
accounts of African thought offered by the anthropologists and specialists in
religion, there is an evaluation implicit in traditionalist accounts.
The
difference is only that whereas in the former case, particularly, where the
authors concerned were Western scholars, the evaluations tended, by and large,
to be negative, in the latter, they have uniformly tended to be positive.
In
itself, that is no problem. But there are, among traditionalists, as hinted
above, clear indications of impatience with any suggestion, on the part of an
African philosopher, that philosophical fallibility might possibly be
encountered in the thought of our ancestors or that there might be some aspect
of an African culture that could be less than ideal from a philosophical point
of view.
Gbadegesin
puts his critique thus: If ethno-philosophy is mistaken, therefore, it is in
two ways:
First,
it mostly describes without criticizing and this does not do justice to the
conceptual schemes it elaborates. Second, by assuming that authentic African
philosophy can only be the traditional worldviews of the people, or nothing, it
presents a narrow view of African philosophy.
Also read: Definition, Divisions, and Problems of Metaphysics
2. Philosophic sagacity
What Oruka calls ‘philosophic-sagacity’ rests on the view that philosophy
resides in the minds of individuals. This trend in African philosophy is
essentially an offshoot of ethno-philosophy, a response to the professional
philosophers’ charge that ethno-philosophy is not philosophy in the proper
sense of the word because it is not the product of an individual mind or
effort.
It
is in this regard that some Western trained philosophers made the effort to
identify specific individuals in traditional African societies who,
uninfluenced by Western thoughts, either had a good grasp of their community’s
ethos and their undergirding rationale, or who had original thoughts that could
be regarded as philosophical.
Specific
mention is here made of the works of Barry Hallen and J. Olubi Sodipo, as well
as Henry Odera Oruka. The former worked together with Yoruba medicine men and
other ‘experts’ in Nigeria in order to elucidate the original Yoruba thought on
truth and morality, while the latter worked with particular individuals in
Kenya to ascertain their specific personal thoughts which sometimes stood at
variance with their community’s positions.
The
argument is that, in Africa, there are many critical independent thinkers who
guide their thoughts and judgments by the power of reason and in-born insight
rather than by authority or communal consensus; and that there are men and
women uninfluenced by Western thoughts who are capable of critical and
dialectical inquiries.
An
example is Marcel Griaule’s “Conversations with Ogotommelli” published in An
Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas. Ogotommelli, an indigenous African, is
seen with evident philosophic sagacity in the exposition of the secret
doctrines of his community.
Efforts
are made in philosophic sagacity to ensure that those objections that have been
raised against ethno-philosophy are corrected.
Thus,
it is identified as the work of an individual, and it is being set down in
writing. Besides, the professional philosophers endeavour to ensure that it is
critical and expressed in a systematic manner. As an objection to philosophic
sagacity, P. O. Bodunrin has pointed out that it is difficult to properly
identify the actual author of the resultant work – between the original sage
and the trained philosopher who has assisted him to elucidate his thoughts, or
between the individual sage and the society whose ideas he tries to expound.
Apart
from this, whether the work be identified as that of the traditional sage or
that of the professional philosopher, it would qualify as African philosophy
simply because it is a work of philosophy which happens to be done by an
African or a scholar working in Africa.
3. Nationalist-ideological philosophy
This is basically political philosophy as
found in the ideas and discourses related to the African anti-colonial struggle
for liberation. The orientation grew out of the need for the emerging class of
political leaders in Africa to give a theoretical or philosophical grounding to
their ideas, a grounding that, for most of them, was to be found in traditional
African ideas about social and political realities.
Thus
the nationalist worldview derives from the political reactions of African
intellectuals to the imperial domination of Africa. These include the works of
leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo,
Leopold Senghor and others. Their purpose was to show that Africans had their
forms of government before the European conquest.
According
to Bodunrin, It is an attempt to evolve a new and, if possible, unique
political theory based on traditional African socialism and familyhood. It is
argued that a true and meaningful freedom must be accompanied by a true mental
liberation and a return, whenever possible and desirable, to genuine and
authentic traditional African humanism.
The
raison d’etre for this need to ground the political thought on traditional
African models stems from the fact that the foreign models were failing in
several parts of Africa, besides the feeling that political independence ought
to be accompanied by intellectual independence.
Two
important questions should be asked concerning this approach to African philosophy.
The
first concerns the rigour and effectiveness of tradition African political
systems: how philosophically coherent were they, and how effective were they in
the running of tradition African society? There is a popular tendency to be
romantic about the African past. But we must ask whether they were, in
themselves, flawless. If they were, how come Africans were easily dominated by
only a handful of foreigners?
The
second question is this: even if they were good and effective for the
traditional African society, how fitting are they for the African society
today? That the first three trends articulated by Bodunrin and Oruka exist side
by side is indubitable, and this is particularly seen in the fact that they
obviously aim to produce a philosophy that is distinctly African.
4. Professional philosophy
This has to do with the insistence on the central importance of critical
rationality in the activity of philosophy. These orientation habours scholars
who see philosophy as a universal discipline with no cultural coloration.
Philosophers
of this orientation argue that philosophy, in its strict sense, is being
practiced in Africa only by professional, Western-trained philosophers because,
for them, all the other orientations do not qualify as genuine philosophy.
Olusegun
Oladipo describes them thus: According to those who hold this (predominantly
Western) view – P. O. Bodunrin, Paulin Hountondji and, to some degree, Kwasi
Wiredu – philosophy is a theoretical discipline like physics, mathematics, and
linguistics and so on.
It
is universal in character, has a methodology which makes it possible for us to
distinguish it from other disciplines, say, anthropology, literary criticism
and political science, and even some central problems or questions in terms of
which its primary preoccupations can be characterized.
Members
of this school posit that what is needed for a work to qualify as African
philosophy is for it to be the philosophy in the proper sense, and the product
of an African intellectual.
In
this regard, Bodunrin (who regards his position as representing those of other
members of the school) asserts that, African philosophy is the philosophy done
by African philosophers whether it be in the area of logic, ethics or history
of philosophy… thus if African philosophers were to engage in debates on
Plato’s epistemology, or on theoretical entities, their work would qualify as
African philosophy.
In
the same vein, Henry Odera Oruka says, …every work that claims to be philosophy
is a philosophy only if the contents and the methodology of its inquiry conform
to the conception that philosophy is a logical argument, a critical inquiry, a
rational speculation or else a synthesis based on a rigorously reasoned-out
investigation.
Scholars
in this orientation reject ethno-philosophy. For them, philosophy must have the
same meaning in all cultures, although the subjects that receive priority and
perhaps the method of dealing with them may be dictated by cultural biases and
the existential situation in the society within which the philosopher operates.
This
orientation in African philosophy obviously has more loyalty to discipline than
to culture, with the implication that it lacks an African content or
colouration, and can therefore not be distinguished from any other kind of
philosophy, except by searching out the identity of its practitioner.
This
approach, according to Bruce Janz, constitutes the “pursuit of a pure
disciplinary definition of African philosophy that fails to recognize linkages,
debts, dynamic movement, and the history of discipline development (which) is
too restrictive.”
As A. G. A. Bello further says, to admit all
manner of discussions, for example, of logic and ontology, Greek science and
religion, the bundle theory of substance, the a-logicality of immortality,
modal metalogic, or theoretical identities (as suggested by, for instance,
Bodunrin 1981), into African philosophy will be to miss the point about the
“ideological” and existential necessity of cultivating African philosophy.
This
is especially because these latter theories, topics, or problems belong to
another philosophical tradition, to wit, the philosophical tradition of our
erstwhile colonizers.
More
importantly, besides the assertion that African philosophy is simply philosophy
as practiced by Africans, much of professional African philosophy seems to have
been negative, committed largely to pointing out what African philosophy is
not.
While
it is true that a philosophical problem should have universal relevance, it is
equally true that a local or context-based colouration of the same
philosophical problem in no way diminishes its universal relevance, but rather
enriches it in certain regards. And in view of this, African philosophy can be
seen as the African perspective or reflection on problems of a universal
status.
According
to Sodipo, “When you say ‘African philosophy’, you are drawing attention to
that aspect of philosophy which arises from a special problem and the unique
experience of African people.”
Also read: Definition and 9 Theories of Ethics
Conclusion on Orientations in African Philosophy
The
point to be made from the foregoing analysis is that issues concerning the
definition, methodology and content of African philosophy are, to a large
extent, construed by different scholars, from the view point of the school or
orientation to which they belong.
These
groupings are divided according to their understanding of what African
philosophy should be and they are united based on the similarities of their positions.
We
have identified and examined four different orientations in African philosophy
according to the most popular classification by Odera Oruka.
Despite
the shades of opinion on how the subject of African philosophy can be
approached, the prevailing position is that there are four main orientations to
African philosophy. This position was popularised by Henry Odera Oruka who
identifies the orientations as ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity,
nationalist-ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy.
Ethno-philosophy
refers to the position that African traditional practices, proverbs, belief
systems and folklores constitute the content, or at least the basic material,
for authentic African philosophy. Philosophic-sagacity’ rests on the view that
philosophy resides in the minds of individuals and that there are specific
individuals in traditional African societies who, uninfluenced by Western
thoughts, had original thoughts that could be regarded as philosophical.
Nationalist
ideological philosophy grew out of the need for the emerging class of political
leaders in Africa to give a theoretical or philosophical grounding to their
ideas, a grounding that, for most of them, was to be found in traditional
African ideas about social and political realities.
Professional
philosophy sees philosophy as a universal discipline with no cultural
colouration, practised solely by professional, Western-trained philosophers in
strict adherence to the canons of critical rationality that define the activity
of philosophy as a universal discipline.
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